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VOLATILITY DISCOVERY ACROSS STOCK LIMIT
ORDER BOOK AND OPTIONS MARKETS
QIN WANG*
Foucault [Journal of Financial Markets, 2, 99–134, 1999] provides a theoretical basis for how
stock price volatility inﬂuences the aggressiveness of limit order traders. I investigate volatility
discovery across stock limit order book and options markets using a broad panel of NYSE‐listed
stocks from November 2007 to January 2008 and ﬁnd strong evidence that, as predicted, the
aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading Granger‐cause each
other. Further, I ﬁnd that the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility
trading are inversely related, which is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. © 2013
Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 34:934–956, 2014
1. INTRODUCTION
Although price discovery across stock and options markets is a subject of widespread interest
(see, e.g., Amin & Lee, 1997; Anthony, 1988; Cao, Chen, & Grifﬁn, 2005; Chakravarty,
Gulen, & Mayhew, 2004; Easley, O’Hara, & Srinivas, 1998; Kumar, Sarin, & Shastri, 1992;
Manaster & Rendleman, 1982; Pan & Poteshman, 2006; Schlag & Stoll, 2005), evidence on
cross‐market volatility discovery is sparse (Lamoureux & Lastrapes, 1993; Ni, Pan, &
Poteshman, 2008).1 Further, Ranaldo (2004) and Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007)
ﬁnd that stock limit orders are informative for future stock price volatility. Foucault (1999)
provides a theoretical basis for how stock price volatility inﬂuences the aggressiveness of limit
order traders and ﬁnds that higher volatility subjects limit order submitters to higher picking
off risk, thus forcing them to price their limit orders less aggressively. These seminal papers
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suggest important potential channels related to the state of the limit order book throughwhich
cross‐market volatility discovery occurs.
However, there is no systematic evidence in this regard. My study aims to answer this
question by analyzing a sample of stocks with data on both the stock limit order book and
option trading with the research design being different from previous literature in that I
analyze how aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading interact
with each other in cross‐market volatility discovery. I ﬁnd striking evidence that cross‐market
volatility discovery occurs through the dynamics between the aggressiveness of the stock limit
order book and option volatility trading.
The intuition behind my research design derives from the fact that limit orders, although
free of price risk, do not have guaranteed execution and are susceptible to picking off risk.
Picking off risk is different from the adverse selection risk (Bagehot, 1971) in that the former
arises when quotes do not timely reﬂect all available public information, and the latter arises
when some traders possess private information not currently reﬂected in security prices.2 The
fact that limit orders are exposed to picking off risk is noted by Copeland and Galai (1983).
Parlour and Seppi (2008) point out that it is because of these two kinds of risk that limit
order books should contain forward‐looking information about future market conditions.
Contrary to the old wisdom that limit orders are uninformed whereas market orders are
informed (see, e.g., Glosten, 1994; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985), recent work on
limit orders ﬁnds that informed traders tend to use limit orders (see, e.g., Anand, Chakravarty,
&Martell, 2005; Bloomﬁeld,O’Hara, &Saar, 2005; Kaniel &Liu, 2006), and that limit orders
are informative for future liquidity (Kavajecz & Odders‐White, 2004), for directions of future
stock price movements (see, e.g., Biais, Hillion, & Spatt, 1995; Cao, Hansch, &Wang, 2009;
Harris &Panchapagesan, 2005), and for future stock price volatility (Ranaldo, 2004; Foucault
et al., 2007). The popularity of limit order trading indicates that the cost of being possibly
picked off together with the execution uncertainty has to be compensated by some forms of
trading gains from using limit orders (see, e.g., Glosten, 1994; Handa & Schwartz, 1996),
which is conﬁrmed empirically by Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) and Holliﬁeld, Miller,
Sandås, and Slive (2006).
In the presence of informed trading, one common prediction from theoretical models of
Glosten (1994), and Seppi (1997) is that investors submitting limit orders are subject to a
winner’s curse, namely limit order non‐execution risk is negatively related to the probability of
incurring a loss.3 Besides, consistent with Grifﬁths, Smith, Turnbull, and White (2000),
Ranaldo (2004), and Aitken, Almeida, Harris, and McInish (2007) provide supporting
empirical evidence that the stock limit order traders’monitoring costs and the level of patience
affect the tradeoff between picking off and non‐execution risk, and thus price aggressiveness
of the stock limit order book.
The implications of these two strands of literature are as follows. First, stock limit order
submitters can adjust the aggressiveness of stock limit order submissions based on volatility
signals from volatility‐related option volumes whereas option traders can adjust option
volatility trading based on predicted future changes in stock price volatility inferred from the
aggressiveness of the stock limit order book. In other words, the aggressiveness of stock limit
2Berkman (1996) shows that option market limit orders on the European Options Exchange in Amsterdam are
commonly picked off after the underlying stock’s price changes. The implication being that professional traders are
able to exploit these limit orders as the individuals who placed them cannot revise them quickly in the face of new
information. Linnainmaa (2010) looks at Finnish data, and ﬁnds that the documented poor performance of retail
traders may be attributed to their use of limit orders.
3Cho and Nelling (2002), Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001), Hasbrouck and Saar (2002), and Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang
(2002) provide empirical evidence that non‐execution risk is negatively related to stock price volatility.
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orders and option volatility trading are informative for each other. Further, the aggressiveness
of stock limit orders is likely to be inversely related to option volatility trading.
To test the hypotheses, I ﬁrst investigate whether the aggressiveness of the stock limit
order book and option volatility trading are informative for predicting each other. Mounting
evidence suggests that stock limit order traders are likely to trade in response to option
volatility trading and that option volatility traders are likely to trade on the aggressiveness of
the stock limit order book. I use the vector autoregression to examine the dynamic relationship
between the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading. In
particular, I investigate whether there is a causal link in the Granger (1969, 1980) sense
between the two and ﬁnd that the two are informative for predicting each other.
Next, I analyze how the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility
trading are related to each other. As discussed earlier, Foucault (1999) shows that higher
volatility increases the picking off risk for limit orders, thus making limit order traders trade
less aggressively. This implies that the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option
volatility trading are inversely related. I examine plots of impulse response functions from the
vector autoregression and ﬁnd supporting evidence with both statistical and economical
signiﬁcance.
I make two major contributions to the literature. First, I increase understanding of
mechanisms of volatility trading across the stock and options markets. To the best of my
knowledge, this is theﬁrst paper to identify newmechanisms of cross‐market volatility discovery
using the state of the stock limit order book. In particular, I show that the aggressiveness of the
stock limit order book and option volatility trading Granger‐cause each other. Further, I show
that the two are inversely related. By explicitly taking into account the informational role of the
stateof thestock limitorderbook incross‐marketvolatility trading,mystudyprovidesnewinsight
into how dynamics of volatility discovery takes place.My results indicate that it is also important
to consider the role of the stock limit order book in cross‐market volatility discovery.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3
discusses variable constructions, methodological issues, and the sample. Section 4 presents
empirical analysis. Section 5 provides robustness checks. Section 6 concludes this study.
2. HYPOTHESES
Prior studies suggest that stock limit order submitters can infer volatility signals from
volatility‐related option volumes and thus adjust the aggressiveness of stock limit orders
accordingly during submissions. Similarly, option traders can infer future changes in stock
price volatility from the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and thus perform option
volatility trading accordingly. My ﬁrst hypothesis can be stated as follows:
H1: The aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading are
informative for predicting each other.
Conditional on heightened option volatility trading, a signal of increasing future stock
price volatility, volatility‐informed stock traders would place stock limit orders less
aggressively due to increased picking off risk, lower non‐execution risk, and increased
monitoring costs. On the other hand, volatility‐informed stock traders would interpret
decreasing option volatility trading as a signal of decreasing future stock price volatility and
thus would become more aggressive in limit order submissions. By the same token,
conditional on a decrease in the aggressiveness of stock limit order book, a signal of increasing
future stock price volatility, volatility‐informed option traders would increase volatility buying
activities including buying calls and/or puts and decrease volatility selling activities including
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selling calls and/or puts. By contrast, an increase in the aggressiveness of stock limit order
book would signal decreasing future stock price volatility and volatility‐informed option
traders would decrease volatility buying activities and increase volatility selling activities. My
second hypothesis can thus be stated as follows:
H2: The aggressiveness of the stock limit order book is negatively related to option volatility buy
and positively related to option volatility sell.
The empirical prediction of the ﬁrst hypothesis is that the aggressiveness variables of the
stock limit order book and the option volatility trading variables Granger‐cause each other and
the empirical prediction of the second hypothesis is that option traders would increase option
volatility buying activities and decrease option volatility selling activities in response to a
decrease in the aggressiveness of stock limit order book and would decrease option volatility
buying activities and increase option volatility selling activities in response to an increase in
the aggressiveness of stock limit order book.
3. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTIONS, METHODOLOGIES, AND DATA
3.1. Variable Constructions
To examine the linkages between the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option
volatility trading, I construct stock aggressiveness variables and option volatility trading
variables.
Based onBiais et al. (1995) that the aggressiveness is in terms of both order size and price
position relative to the prevailing quotes, I use the following three steps to construct the
aggressiveness variables for the stock limit order book. First, I estimate snapshots of the stock
limit order book at 5‐minute intervals using the technique similar to that described in Kavajecz
(1999). Next, I calculate the total depth on each side of the limit order book and the ratio of the
depth at each price step to the total same‐side depth of the book. Third, I take the weighted
average of the depth ratios on each side of the book, with the weight being the inverse of the
absolute value of the difference between the corresponding price and the prevailing midpoint
of the inside spread on the limit order book. Hence, I construct StockAggressiveBuy and
StockAggressiveSell to measure the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book on the buy and
sell sides, respectively.
Stale limit orders are not state‐contingent and are thus subject to picking off risk. If ever
executed, stale limit orders are executed adversely. For those stale limit orders not adversely
executed, they are usually submitted far away from the market. For example, a limit order
trader can submit a good‐to‐cancelled order to buy at an inﬁnitesimally low price which is
unlikely to get executed and thus remains on the limit order book for a long time. Because the
weight used for the unexecuted stale limit order is small as the weight is the inverse of the
absolute value of the difference between the limit order price and prevailing market quote, the
overall effect of unexecuted stale limit orders on the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit
order book is marginal at best. Further, relatively low liquidity companies with less
transparency have more unexecuted stale orders and thus the existence of such orders works
against ﬁnding evidence of dynamic changes in the aggressiveness of the stock limit order
book and option volatility trading. So results reported are conservative.
I construct option volatility trading variables based on the following thoughts. Buying
calls and buying puts are increasing functions of stock price volatility. Besides, buying calls
and buying puts react in the opposite direction to the same change in stock price movement,
which means that option delta trading can be mostly eliminated by aggregating buying calls
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and buying puts. Further, different classes of options have different sensitivities to stock price
volatility and volatility‐informed investors are more likely to trade option contracts with higher
vegas.4 Hence, I construct an option volatility buying variable, OptionVolatilityBuy, by ﬁrst
weighting each option contract by its vega and then summing the vega‐weighted number of
buyer‐initiated call and put contracts. By the same token, I construct an option volatility
selling variable, OptionVolatilitySell, by ﬁrst weighting each option contract by its vega and
then summing the vega‐weighted number of seller‐initiated call and put contracts. By
construction, option volatility trading variables are not correlated with option delta trading
and thus capture true volatility demand.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and
option volatility trading variables. This ﬁgure plots average normalized variables for the 78
ﬁve‐minute intervals throughout one trading day for the whole sample. The upper left and
right panels display StockAggressiveBuy and StockAggressiveSell, respectively. The lower left
and right panels display OptionVolatilityBuy and OptionVolatilitySell, respectively. For
example, the aggressiveness of both buy and sell sides of the stock limit order book increase at
a decreasing rate at the beginning of the trading day, remain almost constant during the day,
and increase dramatically at the very end of the trading day.5
3.2. Methodologies
My goal is to examine the possible volatility linkages, if any, between the aggressiveness of the
stock limit order book and option volatility trading. For a given high‐volatility signal,
volatility‐informed stock traders might place limit orders less aggressively due to increased
picking off risk, whereas volatility‐informed option traders might increase buying calls and
puts, and/or decrease selling calls and puts. In contrast, for a given low‐volatility signal, the
reverse might be true. Hence, bivariate Granger‐causality is likely, which motivates the vector
autoregression (VAR) methodology.
There are several issues that must be addressed before using the VAR. First, following
Stephan and Whaley (1990) and Easley et al. (1998) that examine the linkages across the
stock and options markets, I partition each trading day (9:30 am EST to 4:00 pm EST) into 78
ﬁve‐minute intervals. I extract aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book from the
limit order book snapshots estimated at 5‐minute intervals using the technique similar to that
described in Kavajecz (1999). I obtain option volume series by aggregating relevant option
contracts within each 5‐minute interval. To control for cross‐sectional variations across
different stocks and options, I normalize each series by subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation for each day, which allows me to pool the 529 stocks together and to
increase the power of the tests. Finally, I conduct augmented Dickey–Fuller tests on all four
normalized series including two stock aggressiveness series and two option volume series
allowing for individual intercepts, and use information criteria to select the number of
4I calculate vega based onmethods proposed inCox, Ross, andRubinstein (1979). I ﬁrst build a recombining binomial
stock tree with discrete dividends, and value American options on the tree by applying the backward induction
technique. I then rebuild the binomial stock tree with a small increase in volatility and value options similarly as
before. Vega is then approximated by the ratio of change in option value with respect to volatility.
5It is interesting to note that at the end of the day, both StockAggressiveBuy and StockAggressiveSell increase abruptly.
One plausible explanation is that sincemajority of the limit orders are good till market close on theNYSE, so when the
market is approaching closing time, good‐till‐market‐close limit orders become much more aggressive to try to get
last‐minute execution. Please refer to Bae, Jang, and Park (2003) for a description of order type percentage
breakdowns for the 144 NYSE stocks in the TORQ database from November 1990 to January 1991. Informal talks
with the data provider also indicate that majority of the limit orders are good till market close on the NYSE for my
sample period. However, the abrupt increase in aggressiveness does not impact the intraday relationship between
aggressiveness and volatility variables as shown in the following empirical analysis.
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augmentation lags. I reject the existence of a unit root at P values less than 0.0001. Thus, all
the normalized series are stationary and are then used in the VAR analysis.
To explore the direction of the effects of shocks on the aggressiveness of the stock limit
order book and option volatility trading, I consider a four‐equation vector autoregression that
incorporates four variables including two aggressiveness variables from the stock limit order
book and two option volatility trading variables. Speciﬁcally, I use the following system:
St ¼
XK
i¼1
aiSti þ
XK
i¼1
biOti þ ut;
Ot ¼
XK
i¼1
g iSti þ
XK
i¼1
diOti þ et;
where St is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the aggressiveness of the buy and sell sides of the
stock limit order book,Ot is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the option volatility trading, andK is
the number of lags. Inmy empirical estimation, I chooseK based on the Akaike, Schwartz, and
Hannan‐Quinn information criteria. If these three criteria indicate different lag lengths, I
choose the lesser one for the sake of parsimony.
Based on estimates of the VARs, I calculate impulse response functions and examine
how the endogenous variables react with each other over time. An impulse response function
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FIGURE 1
Normalized aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading variables.
Note. This ﬁgure plots average normalized aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book and
option volatility trading variables for the 78 ﬁve‐minute intervals throughout one trading day for the 529
stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook History (Openbook) database and the Options Price Reporting
Authority (OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and January 31, 2008. See Table I for variable
deﬁnitions.
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traces the effect of a one‐time one standard deviation shock to one of the innovations on
current and future values of the endogenous variables through the dynamic structure of the
VAR. If innovations are correlated, they need to be orthogonalized ﬁrst. I use the inverse of the
Cholesky decomposition of the residual covariance matrix to orthogonalize the impulses.
Although impulse response functions trace the effects of a shock to one endogenous variable
on the other variables in the VAR, variance decomposition decomposes variation in an
endogenous variable into the component shocks to the endogenous variables in the VAR. The
source of this forecast error is the variation in the current and future values of the innovations
to each endogenous variable in the VAR.
Results on impulse response functions and variance decompositions are generally
contingent on the speciﬁc orderings of the endogenous variables. Unreported results show
that my ﬁndings are robust to the ordering of endogenous variables. In the following analysis,
the stock aggressiveness variables are placed before the option volatility trading variables
unless otherwise noted.
3.3. Data
I use several data sources for this paper. I construct the aggressiveness variables of the stock
limit order book from the NYSE OpenBook History (Openbook) database, which provides the
aggregate limit‐order volume at every bid and offer price for all NYSE‐traded securities
throughout each trading day. I extract option volume from the Options Price Reporting
Authority (OPRA) database, which contains a complete record of quote and trade prices of
options traded on all U.S. options exchanges time‐stamped to the nearest second. Data on
ex‐dividend dates and daily cash dividends are from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database. I hand collect ask yields of daily Treasury bills matching maturities of
options from the Bloomberg as risk‐free rates. I obtain data on high‐frequency quote and trade
at 5‐minute intervals from the trade and quote (TAQ) database. My sample period is from
November 1, 2007, to January 31, 2008, since it is a relatively quiet time period which allows
full and normal interplay among variables of interest.
I delete stocks in ﬁnancial service (SIC 6,000–6,999), stocks in regulated utilities (SIC
4,800–4,829 and 4,910–4,949), foreign stocks, stocks with prices less than $5, stocks that
split, and stocks that experience mergers and acquisitions during my sample period. I also
delete stocks with no data in TAQ.
Following Lee and Ready (1991) and Easley et al. (1998), I pair each trade with the most
recent quote that is no older than 30minutes, and proceed in the following steps for trade
classiﬁcation. First, a trade occurring above (below) the midpoint is classiﬁed as a buy (sell).
Second, a trade occurring at the midpoint with the current trade price being higher (lower)
than its previous one is classiﬁed as a buy (sell), which is the “tick test.” Finally, a trade
occurring at the midpoint with the current trade price being the same as its previous one is
classiﬁed as a buy (sell) if the previous price is higher (lower) than its previous one, which is
the “zero‐tick test.” Trades that cannot be classiﬁed using the above steps are discarded.
I apply the following exclusion ﬁlters to the option data. I discard quotes not satisfying
the no‐arbitrage restrictions. To mitigate the impact of tick size on option valuation, I exclude
option quotes lower than $0.375. To control for option hedging behavior, I exclude option
trades with condition code P.6 To avoid option expiration induced abnormal trading, I exclude
option trades with less than or equal to a week tomaturity. To alleviate possible biases induced
by thin trading, I exclude option‐stock days with less than or equal to 50 option trades per day.
6Option trades with condition code P represent the option portion of an order involving a single option leg (buy or sell
of a call or a put) and stock.
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To control for ex‐dividend effects, I exclude option trades on ex‐dates of underlying stocks. To
avoid stock split induced abnormal trading, I exclude option trades on split days of underlying
stocks. To eliminate nonsynchronicity in trading of options and stocks, I exclude option trades
that are time‐stamped after 3:00 pm CST. To mitigate possible mistakes of reporting multiple
trades for one large trade with multiple counterparties, I aggregate option trades occurring
within 5 seconds of each other with the same trade price, same trade direction, and same
prevailing quotes into one trade.
Taking the intersection of the ﬁltered stock limit order data and option trades data leaves
529 ﬁrms with 6,889 pairs of option‐stock days.
I reconstruct each stock’s limit order book using the technique similar to that described
in Kavajecz (1999). I start with the provided snap shot of the limit order book as of the close of
operation of the open book system on the previous day, select incremental changes to the
number of shares for each price point for each stock before the chosen time, sum shares by
price point on buy and sell sides, and eliminate price points where the aggregate number of
shares is 0. The remaining set of orders is thus the limit order book estimate for the chosen
time on that day. I sequentially update limit order book estimates every 5minutes till 4:00 pm
EST, resulting in 78 limit order book estimates each day for each stock.7
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Before formally examining the volatility discovery across the aggressiveness of the stock limit
order book and option volatility trading, Table I reports summary statistics of the variables of
interest.
Statistics in Table I are reported before normalization. Panel A of Table I shows that over
my sample period mean and median StockAggressiveBuy are 4.89 and 3.80, respectively,
whereas mean and median StockAggressiveSell are 3.39 and 2.78, respectively. This indicates
that the stock limit order book shows slightly more aggressiveness on the buy side than on the
sell side. Panel B of Table I shows that mean andmedianOptionVolatilitySell (165.08; 17.73)
are bigger than those for OptionVolatilityBuy (162.00; 14.82), respectively. This indicates
that, on average, selling calls and/or puts is slightly more than buying calls and/or puts.
I now turn to empirical investigations of volatility discovery across the aggressiveness of
the stock limit order book and option volatility trading.
4.1. Pairwise Granger‐Causality Tests
Table II reports the results of the pairwise Granger‐causality tests using three 5‐minute lags.
Consistent with the prediction of the hypothesis, I observe that the feedback effect exists
between the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading.
For example, the null hypothesis that StockAggressiveBuy does not Granger‐cause
OptionVolatilityBuy is rejected with a Wald test statistic of 83.145, signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. This implies that StockAggressiveBuy Granger‐causes OptionVolatilityBuy. Besides, the
null hypothesis that OptionVolatilityBuy does not Granger‐cause StockAggressiveBuy is
rejected with a Wald test statistic of 30.949, signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This implies that
OptionVolatilityBuy Granger‐causes StockAggressiveBuy. Granger‐causality runs in both
directions between StockAggressiveBuy and OptionVolatilityBuy, which clearly indicates the
feedback effect between the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility
trading.
7As pointed out by Aitken et al. (2007), snapshots approach is a research design free of systematic sampling bias for
measuring the aggressiveness variables.
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Note that variable i Granger‐causing variable j does not imply that i causes j to happen.
Granger‐causality measures precedence and information content, namely, whether adding
past values of one variable to an autoregressive model of the other variable improves the
predictability of the other variable.
4.1.1. Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by time of day
Foster and Viswanathan (1990) document larger trade impacts at the beginning and at the
end of the day. This indicates that trading is more likely to be informed at the beginning
and at the end of the day and that percentages of stocks with Granger‐causality running in
either or both directions between the stock aggressiveness and option volatility trading
variables are bigger at the beginning and at the end of the day. To test this, I partition the
trading day into the ﬁrst 1 hour and a half trading (9:30 am–11:00 am), the middle day
(11:00 am–2:30 pm), and the last 1 hour and a half trading (2:30 pm–4:00 pm). Table III
TABLE I
Summary Statistics
Variable name Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Panel A: Summary statistics for stock aggressiveness variables
StockAggressiveBuy 4.89 3.80 4.14 0.04 151.37
StockAggressiveSell 3.39 2.78 2.58 0.10 135.08
Panel B: Summary statistics for option trading variables
OptionVolatilityBuy 162.00 14.82 1004.49 0.00 193139.51
OptionVolatilitySell 165.08 17.73 1066.60 0.00 152981.53
Note. This table reports summary statistics of the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading
variables for the 529 stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook History (Openbook) database and the Options Price Reporting Authority
(OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and January 31, 2008. I use the following three steps to construct the
aggressiveness variables for the stock limit order book. First, I estimate snapshots of the limit order book at 5‐minute intervals using
the technique similar to that described in Kavajecz (1999). Next, I calculate the total depth on each side of the limit order book and
the ratio of the depth at each price step to the total same side depth of the book. Third, I take theweighted average of the depth ratios
on each side of the book, with the weight being the inverse of the absolute value of the difference between the corresponding price
and the prevailing midpoint of the inside spread on the limit order book. StockAggressiveBuy and StockAggressiveSell are the
weighted averages of the depth at each price step on the buy and sell sides to the total same side depth of the book, respectively.
Option trading variables are aggregated over 5‐minute intervals. OptionVolatilityBuy is the total number of vega‐weighted
buyer‐initiated option contracts.OptionVolatilitySell is the total number of vega‐weighted seller‐initiated option contracts. All series
are before normalization.
TABLE II
Pairwise Granger‐Causality Tests
StockAggressiveBuy StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy OptionVolatilitySell
StockAggressiveBuy 83.15 150.03
StockAggressiveSell 114.59 171.18
OptionVolatilityBuy 30.95 11.89
OptionVolatilitySell 37.00 16.59
Note. This table reports the results from a VAR with endogenous variables in the order of StockAggressiveBuy,
StockAggressiveSell, OptionVolatilityBuy, and OptionVolatilitySell. The VAR is estimated with three lags. Wald test statistics of
pairwise Granger‐causality tests between each aggressiveness variable of the stock limit order book and each option volatility
trading variable are reported. The null hypothesis is that the row variable does not Granger‐cause the column variable. All variables
used have been normalized. All the Wald test statistics are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. See Table I for variable deﬁnitions.
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reports the percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant
Granger‐causality at the 5% level based on F‐tests using three lags by time of day. “Stock
to Option” means the stock aggressiveness variables Granger‐causing the option volatility
trading variables. “Option to Stock” means the option volatility trading variables
Granger‐causing the stock aggressiveness variables. Consistent with the prediction from
Foster and Viswanathan (1990), results in Table III show that the percentages of stocks in
the categories of both “Stock to Option” and “Option to Stock” are higher at the beginning
and at the end of the day. For example, StockAggressiveBuy Granger‐causes OptionVo-
latilityBuy in 15% and 16% of the sample stocks at the beginning and at the end of the day,
but in 13% of the sample stocks at the middle of the day.
4.1.2. Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by time of day and bid–ask spread
Further, I sort sample stocks into terciles by decreases in the inside bid–ask spread on the
snapshot of the stock limit order book at the beginning of November 1, 2007. Table IV reports
results in this regard. I ﬁnd that the percentage of stocks in the category of “Stock toOption” is
generally bigger for large than for small bid–ask spread at the beginning and at the end of the
trading day. For example, at the end of the trading day, StockAggressiveBuy Granger‐causes
OptionVolatilityBuy in 5% of the sample stocks for large bid–ask spread, and in 4% of the
sample stocks for small bid–ask spread, respectively. I do not observe the similar patterns for
the middle day trading.
Consistent with the results in Table III, I ﬁnd that percentages of stocks in the
category of “Stock to Option” at the beginning and at the end of the trading day are
larger when bid–ask spread is large or medium in Table IV. It is also evident from
Table IV that the percentage of stocks in “Stock to Option” is bigger than that in “Option
to Stock.”
TABLE III
Pairwise Granger‐Causality Tests by Time of Day
Time interval Stock variable Option trading variable Stock to option Option to stock
9:30 am–11:00 am StockAggressiveBuy Optionvolatilitybuy 15.00 11.54
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 14.04 9.04
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 14.04 11.92
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 15.58 11.73
11:00 am–2:30 pm StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 12.88 7.50
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 10.00 6.54
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 11.54 6.73
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 10.58 5.58
2:30 pm–4:00 pm StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 15.77 10.38
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 14.42 13.27
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 13.65 13.65
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 14.04 15.96
Note. This table reports the percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant Granger‐causality at the 5%
level based on F‐tests using three lags by time of day. The sample includes the 529 stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook
History (Openbook) database and the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and
January 31, 2008. “Stock to Option” means the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book Granger‐causing the
option volatility trading variables. “Option to Stock” means the option volatility trading variables Granger‐causing the
aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book. All variables used have been normalized. See Table I for variable
deﬁnitions.
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4.1.3. Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by option moneyness
Table V reports the percentages of stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant
Granger‐causality at the 5% level based on F‐tests using three lags by option moneyness. I
deﬁne, respectively, in‐the‐money (ITM) options as call options with moneyness less than
TABLE IV
Pairwise Granger‐Causality Tests by Time of Day and Bid–Ask Spread
Time interval
Bid–ask
spread
Stock aggressiveness
variable
Option trading
variable
Stock to
option
Option to
stock
9:30 am–11:00 am Large StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 5.38 3.46
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 4.04 3.65
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 5.00 5.00
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 4.81 3.85
Medium StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 5.96 3.65
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 5.58 2.50
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 6.92 3.08
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 5.96 4.23
Small StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 3.65 4.42
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 4.42 2.88
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 2.12 3.85
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 4.81 3.65
11:00 am–2:30 pm Large StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 4.23 2.50
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 2.50 2.88
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 3.46 2.50
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 3.46 2.31
Medium StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 3.85 3.65
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 3.46 1.92
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 2.88 2.12
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 4.23 2.50
Small StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 4.81 1.35
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 4.04 1.73
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 5.19 2.12
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 2.88 0.77
2:30 pm–4:00 pm Large StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 5.19 3.65
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 4.04 4.62
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 4.23 3.85
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 5.58 5.58
Medium StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 6.92 3.27
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 6.54 4.23
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 4.81 5.00
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 4.42 4.42
Small StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 3.65 3.46
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 3.85 4.42
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 4.62 4.81
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 4.04 5.96
Note. This table reports the percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant Granger‐causality at the 5% level
based on F‐tests using three lags by time of day and bid–ask spread. The sample includes the 529 stocks in both the NYSE
OpenBookHistory (Openbook) database and the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) database betweenNovember 1, 2007
and January 31, 2008. The 529 stocks are sorted into terciles by decreases in the inside bid–ask spread on the snapshot of the
stock limit order book at the beginning of November 1, 2007. “Stock toOption”means the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit
order book Granger‐causing the option volatility trading variables. “Option to Stock” means the option volatility trading variables
Granger‐causing the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book. All variables used have been normalized. See Table I
for variable deﬁnitions.
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0.95 and put options with moneyness more than 1.05, out‐of‐the‐money (OTM) options as
call options with moneyness greater than 1.05 and put options with moneyness less than
0.95, at‐the‐money (ATM) options with moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05, inclusively.
Results in Table V show that percentages of stocks in the category of “Stock to Option” for
OTM options are smaller than those for ATM options. Results from Table V also show that
percentages of stocks in the category of “Option to Stock” for OTM options are mostly
bigger than those for ATM options. The only exception is for the pair of Stock-
AggressiveSell and OptionVolatilityBuy in the “Option to Stock” category. Consistent with
Lee and Yi (2001) and Chakravarty et al. (2004), my results provide evidence that
informed option trading is more concentrated in OTM options resulting from their higher
leverage effects.
To sum up, consistent with the prediction of the hypothesis, I ﬁnd that the feedback
effect exists between the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book and the option
volatility trading variables. Further, I ﬁnd that the percentage of stocks with Granger‐causality
running from stock aggressiveness variables to option volatility trading variables is higher at
the beginning and at the end of the trading day, is generally higher for large than for small bid–
ask spread, and is lower for OTM options than for ATM options.
4.2. Variance Decompositions
I also perform variance decompositions of each variable in the four‐equation VAR and report
the estimates of variance decompositions (%), as well as the forecast standard errors estimated
with 1,000 simulation runs for two forecast periods with two different variable orderings in
Table VI. Consistent with the prediction of the hypothesis, I ﬁnd that the stock aggressiveness
variables and the option volatility trading variables can explain each other.
TABLE V
Pairwise Granger‐Causality Tests by Option Moneyness
Moneyness Stock variable Option trading variable Stock to option Option to stock
ATM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 16.15 10.58
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 18.65 9.42
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 14.81 12.12
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 17.12 7.88
ITM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 12.69 8.46
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 13.46 10.00
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 15.00 11.54
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 16.15 9.81
OTM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 12.88 10.38
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 12.50 11.92
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 13.46 9.62
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 13.27 10.77
Note. This table reports the percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant Granger causality at the 5% level
based on F‐tests using three lags by option moneyness. The sample includes the 529 stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook History
(Openbook) database and the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and January 31,
2008. I deﬁne, respectively, in‐the‐money options as call options with moneyness less than 0.95 and put options with moneyness
more than 1.05, out‐of‐the‐money options as call options with moneyness greater than 1.05 and put options with moneyness less
than 0.95, at‐the‐money options with moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05, inclusively. “Stock to Option”means the aggressiveness
variables of the stock limit order book Granger‐causing the option volatility trading variables. “Option to Stock” means the option
volatility trading variablesGranger‐causing the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book. All variables used have been
normalized. See Table I for variable deﬁnitions.
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4.3. Stock Skewness and Asymmetry in Buy Versus Sell Aggressiveness in
Limit Order Book
Table VII reports the results from a VAR with endogenous variables in the order of stock
skewness and the asymmetry of buys versus sells in the limit order book, where I use stock
return skewness, moneyness‐based forward looking stock skewness, and volume‐based
forward looking stock skewness, respectively. Stock Return Skewness is the skewness of
5‐minute stock return over the trading day.Moneyness is deﬁned as the ratio of the strike price
to the underlying stock price. Moneyness‐Based Forward Looking Stock Skewness is the
difference between the implied volatilities of an OTM put and an ATM call, where I choose
one OTM put option with its moneyness closest to 0.95 and one ATM call option with its
moneyness closest to 1. Volume‐Based Forward Looking Stock Skewness is the difference
between the option‐volume weighted implied volatilities of OTM puts and ATM calls, where
TABLE VI
Variance Decompositions
5‐Minute intervals
ahead (n)
Forecast
standard
error
Explanatory variable
StockAggressiveBuy StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy OptionVolatilitySell
Panel A: VAR ordering of StockAggressiveBuy, StockAggressiveSell, OptionVolatilityBuy, and
OptionVolatilitySell
StockAggressiveBuy
1 0.0086 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.0096 96.29 3.70 0.01 0.01
StockAggressiveSell
1 0.0085 3.82 96.18 0.00 0.00
10 0.0096 9.75 90.24 0.00 0.00
OptionVolatilityBuy
1 0.0096 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
10 0.0096 0.04 0.05 99.65 0.26
OptionVolatilitySell
1 0.0096 0.00 0.00 3.82 96.17
10 0.0096 0.08 0.07 4.16 95.69
Panel B: VAR ordering of OptionVolatilityBuy, and OptionVolatilitySell, StockAggressiveBuy, and
StockAggressiveSell
StockAggressiveBuy
1 0.0086 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.0096 96.28 3.69 0.01 0.01
StockAggressiveSell
1 0.0085 3.82 96.18 0.00 0.00
10 0.0096 9.75 90.24 0.00 0.01
OptionVolatilityBuy
1 0.0096 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
10 0.0096 0.04 0.05 99.65 0.26
OptionVolatilitySell
1 0.0096 0.00 0.00 3.83 96.17
10 0.0096 0.08 0.07 4.16 95.69
Note. This table reports the variance decompositions of the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility
trading variables n 5‐minute intervals ahead, computed from a VAR with endogenous variables StockAggressiveBuy,
StockAggressiveSell, OptionVolatilityBuy, and OptionVolatilitySell. The VAR is estimated with three lags. For each VAR, I report
the estimates of variance decompositions (%), as well as the forecast standard errors estimated with 1,000 simulation runs for two
forecast periods. The sample includes the 529 stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook History (Openbook) database and the Options
Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and January 31, 2008. All variables used have been
normalized. See Table I for variable deﬁnitions.
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all OTM puts with moneyness between 0.80 and 0.95, and all ATM calls with moneyness
between 0.95 and 1.05 are used.
When there is upcoming bad news about the stock, informed stock limit order traders
will sell the stock more aggressively. When there is upcoming good news about the stock,
informed stock limit order traders will buy the stock more aggressively. So the asymmetry of
buys versus sells in the limit order book reﬂects the upcoming perception of the stock. On the
other hand, bigger forward looking skewness is associated with bad news about the future
stock price, as option traders, if there is bad news about the stock, are more likely to buy put
options than to short put options either for hedging or speculative purposes, which pushes up
both the price and implied volatilities of the put. It is likely that option traders trade in
response to the asymmetry of buys versus sells in the limit order book, and stock limit order
traders trade in response to implied volatility skew. Consistently, results in Table VII show that
only forward looking stock skewness (both moneyness‐based and volume‐based) and the
asymmetry of buys versus sells in the limit order book Granger‐cause each other.
4.4. Impulse Response Functions
To better understand the direction of the effect on the option volatility trading variables of a
positive one‐standard deviation shock to the stock aggressiveness variables and vice versa, I
plot the impulse response functions in the four‐equation vector autoregressions (VARs) with
endogenous variables in the order of StockAggressiveBuy, StockAggressiveSell, OptionVola-
tilityBuy, andOptionVolatilitySell in Figure 2. The VAR is estimated using three lags selected
as the least lag length indicated by the Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannan‐Quinn information
criteria. Plots of impulse response functions are generally consistent with the results of
TABLE VII
Stock Skewness and Asymmetry in Aggressiveness of Buys Versus Sells in the
Limit Order Book
Stock return
skewness
Moneyness‐based
forward looking
stock skewness
Forward looking
Stock
skewness
Asymmetry in
aggressiveness of stock
limit order book
Stock return skewness 0.56n
Moneyness‐based forward looking
stock skewness
21.78
Volume‐based forward looking
stock skewness
20.64
Asymmetry in aggressiveness of
stock limit order book
0.86n 19.12 20.43
Note. This table reports the results from a VAR with endogenous variables in the order of stock skewness and the asymmetry of
buys versus sells in the limit order book. The VAR is estimated with three lags. Wald test statistics of pairwise Granger‐causality
tests are reported. The null hypothesis is that the row variable does not Granger‐cause the column variable. Asymmetry in
Aggressiveness of Stock Limit Order Book is StockAggressiveBuy minus StockAggressiveSell. Stock Return Skewness is the
skewness of 5‐minute stock return over the trading day. Moneyness is deﬁned as the ratio of the strike price to the underlying stock
price.Moneyness‐Based Forward Looking Stock Skewness is the difference between the implied volatilities of an OTM put and an
ATM call, where I choose one OTM put option with its moneyness closest to 0.95 and one ATM call option with its moneyness
closest to 1. Volume‐Based Forward Looking Stock Skewness is the difference between the option‐volume weighted implied
volatilities of OTM puts and ATM calls, where all OTM puts with moneyness between 0.80 and 0.95, and all ATM calls with
moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05 are used. Wald test statistics of pairwise Granger‐causality tests between each skewness
variable and the asymmetry in aggressiveness of Stock Limit Order Book are reported. Wald test statistics with a superscript n are
not signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Wald test statistics without any superscripts are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The sample includes the
529 stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook History (Openbook) database and the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA)
database between November 1, 2007 and January 31, 2008.
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(A) Response of StockAggressiveBuy to            (B) Response of StockAggressiveBuy to 
OptionVolatilityBuy                                     OptionVolatilitySell 
(C) Response of StockAggressiveSell to            (D) Response of StockAggressiveSell to 
OptionVolatilityBuy                                     OptionVolatilitySell 
(E) Response of OptionVolatilityBuy to             (F) Response of OptionVolatilityBuy to 
StockAggressiveBuy                                   StockAggressiveSell 
(G) Response of OptionVolatilitySell to           (H) Response of OptionVolatilitySell to 
StockAggressiveBuy                                    StockAggressiveSell 
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FIGURE 2
Impulse response functions.
Note. VAR with endogenous variables in the order of StockAggressiveBuy, StockAggressiveSell,
OptionVolatilityBuy, and OptionVolatilitySell is estimates with three lags. I graph impulse responses
(solid lines) of each variable along with corresponding two‐standard‐error bands (dashed lines). The
error bands are based on Monte Carlo Integration with 1,000 simulations. Only normalized series are
used in the VAR estimation. See Table I for variable deﬁnitions. [Color ﬁgure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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Granger‐causality tests, and can provide further views on the dynamic relationships between
the endogenous variables.Monte Carlo two‐standard‐error conﬁdence bands (based on 1,000
simulations) are also plotted to gauge the statistical signiﬁcance of the impulse response
functions. Contemporaneous response corresponds to period 1, whereas lagged responses
correspond to subsequent periods. To conserve space, only impulse response plots of the
VARs that are directly related to examining cross‐market price discovery are reported.8
Panels A–DofFigure 2 plot responses of stock aggressiveness variables to shocks to option
volatility trading variables. Panels E–H of Figure 2 plot responses of option volatility trading
variables to shocks to stock aggressiveness variables. For example, Panels A and C of Figure 2
show that bothStockAggressiveBuy andStockAggressiveSelldecrease signiﬁcantly in response to
a positive one‐time one standard deviation shock to OptionVolatilityBuy, with both responses
reachingtheir troughs inperiod3.Thetwo‐standard‐errorbandsindicatethat thisresult ishighly
signiﬁcant.Thisprovidesevidencethatvolatility‐informedstock tradersplacebuyandsellorders
less aggressively to minimize the picking off risk resulting from an increase in stock price
volatility. Panel B of Figure 2 provides evidence that volatility‐informed stock traders place buy
ordersmoreaggressivelydueto thediminishingpickingoff risk resulting fromadecrease instock
price volatility. Similar supportive evidence can be gleaned from Panel D of Figure 2.
The impact of stock aggressiveness variables on option volatility trading is economically
signiﬁcant. For example, using the accumulated response over 10 periods (50minutes) and
assuming 250 trading days in a year and 78 ﬁve‐minute intervals in a day, the effect of one
standard deviation shock to StockAggressiveBuy on OptionVolatilitySell aggregates to an
annualized amount of 80 million equity options contract volume, equivalent to an extra
10 days of options volume.9
In a word, consistent with the prediction of the hypothesis, I ﬁnd that the aggressiveness
variables of the stock limit order book is inversely related to option volatility buy and positively
related to option volatility sell.
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
I now check whether my Granger‐causality ﬁndings are robust to including forward looking
stock skew in the VAR. Speciﬁcally, the VAR with forward looking stock skew is
St ¼
XK
i¼1
aiSti þ
XK
i¼1
biOti þ
XK
i¼1
uiSkewti þ ut
Ot ¼
XK
i¼1
g iSti þ
XK
i¼1
diOti þ et
where St is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the aggressiveness of the buy and sell sides of the
stock limit order book,Ot is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the option volatility trading. Skew is
moneyness‐based forward looking stock skewness or volume‐based forward looking stock
skewness. K is the number of lags. The VAR is estimated with three lags based on the Akaike,
Schwartz, and Hannan‐Quinn information criteria.
Table VIII reproduces the main Granger‐causality test results using the VAR controlling
for moneyness‐based forward looking stock skewness. It is obvious that my ﬁndings hold when
8Unreported impulse responses are available from the author upon request.
9Based on market statistics issued by CBOE, daily equity options contract volume on all U.S. options exchanges
amounts to about 8 million in 2007. http://www.cboe.com/data/AnnualMarketStatistics.aspx.
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TABLE VIII
Robustness Checks: Granger‐Causality Tests Controlling for Moneyness‐Based Forward
Looking Stock Skew
StockAggressiveBuy StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy OptionVolatilitySell
Panel A: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests
StockAggressiveBuy 78.12 148.68
StockAggressiveSell 110.46 167.35
OptionVolatilityBuy 32.06 15.62
OptionVolatilitySell 38.87 18.76
Time interval Stock variable Option trading variable Stock to option Option to stock
Panel B: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by time of day
9:30 am–11:00 am StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 13.88 12.08
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 13.06 10.33
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 13.05 12.24
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 14.21 13.07
11:00 am–2:30 pm StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 10.96 7.99
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 9.23 7.01
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 10.26 7.05
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 9.04 6.36
2:30 pm–4:00 pm StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 13.11 11.13
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 12.38 14.02
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 12.04 14.18
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 13.17 16.14
Moneyness Stock variable Option trading variable Stock to option Option to stock
Panel C: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by option moneyness
ATM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 14.23 12.05
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 16.01 10.22
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 13.29 12.78
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 15.74 9.01
ITM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 10.16 8.79
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 11.52 11.26
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 14.08 13.05
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 15.21 10.59
OTM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 10.19 13.12
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 10.24 12.79
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 13.02 12.94
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 11.64 12.57
Note. This table reports the results from the following VAR: St ¼
PK
i¼1 ai St -i þ
PK
i¼1 bi Ot -i þ
PK
i¼1 ui Skewt -i þ ut , and
Ot ¼
PK
i¼1 g i St -i þ
PK
i¼1 di Ot -i þ et , where St is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the aggressiveness of the buy and sell sides of the
stock limit order book,Ot is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the option volatility trading. Moneyness is deﬁned as the ratio of the strike
price to the underlying stock price.Skew ismoneyness‐based forward looking stock skewness deﬁned as the difference between the
implied volatilities of an OTM put and an ATM call, where I choose one OTM put option with its moneyness closest to 0.95 and one
ATM call option with its moneyness closest to 1. K is the number of lags. The VAR is estimated with three lags based on the Akaike,
Schwartz, and Hannan‐Quinn information criteria. In panel A, Wald test statistics of pairwise Granger‐causality tests between each
aggressiveness variable of the stock limit order book and each option volatility trading variable are reported. The null hypothesis is
that the row variable does not Granger‐cause the column variable. All theWald test statistics are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Panel B
reports the percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant Granger‐causality at the 5% level based on F‐tests
using three lags by time of day. “Stock to Option”means the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book Granger‐causing
the option volatility trading variables. “Option to Stock” means the option volatility trading variables Granger‐causing the
aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book. Panel C reports the percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically
signiﬁcant Granger causality at the 5% level based on F‐tests using three lags by option moneyness. I deﬁne, respectively,
in‐the‐money options as call options with moneyness less than 0.95 and put options with moneyness more than 1.05,
out‐of‐the‐money options as call options with moneyness greater than 1.05 and put options with moneyness less than 0.95,
at‐the‐money options with moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05, inclusively. All variables used have been normalized. See Table I for
variable deﬁnitions. The sample includes the 529 stocks in both the NYSEOpenBookHistory (Openbook) database and the Options
Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and January 31, 2008.
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TABLE IX
Robustness Checks: Granger‐Causality Tests Controlling for Volume‐Based Forward
Looking Stock Skew
StockAggressiveBuy StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy OptionVolatilitySell
Panel A: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests
StockAggressiveBuy 78.01 147.12
StockAggressiveSell 111.02 165.10
OptionVolatilityBuy 31.86 15.69
OptionVolatilitySell 37.92 18.21
Time interval Stock variable Option trading variable Stock to option Option to stock
Panel B: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by time of day
9:30 am–11:00 am StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 13.92 12.11
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 13.11 10.42
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 12.97 12.25
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 14.33 13.09
11:00 am–2:30 pm StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 10.72 8.03
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 9.39 7.12
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 10.14 7.08
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 9.21 6.40
2:30 pm–4:00 pm StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 13.26 11.15
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 12.41 14.00
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 12.06 14.19
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 13.15 16.12
Moneyness Stock variable Option trading variable Stock to option Option to stock
Panel C: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by option moneyness
ATM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 14.09 12.06
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 15.89 10.18
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 13.27 12.66
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 15.68 9.13
ITM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 10.14 8.74
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 11.50 11.12
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 14.07 13.13
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 15.18 10.51
OTM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 10.17 13.09
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 10.22 12.26
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 13.02 12.83
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 11.63 12.27
Note. This table reports the results from the following VAR: St ¼
PK
i¼1 ai St -i þ
PK
i¼1 biOt -i þ
PK
i¼1 ui Skewt -i þ ut , and
Ot ¼
PK
i¼1 g i St -i þ
PK
i¼1 di Ot -i þ et , where St is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the aggressiveness of the buy and sell sides of the
stock limit order book,Ot is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the option volatility trading. Moneyness is deﬁned as the ratio of the strike
price to the underlying stock price. Skew is volume‐based forward looking stock skewness deﬁned as the difference between the
option‐volume weighted implied volatilities of OTM puts and ATM calls, where all OTM puts with moneyness between 0.80 and
0.95, and all ATM calls with moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05 are used. K is the number of lags. The VAR is estimated with three
lags based on the Akaike, Schwartz, and Hannan‐Quinn information criteria. In panel A, Wald test statistics of pairwise
Granger‐causality tests between each aggressiveness variable of the stock limit order book and each option volatility trading
variable are reported. The null hypothesis is that the row variable does not Granger‐cause the column variable. All the Wald test
statistics are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Panel B reports the percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant
Granger‐causality at the 5% level based on F‐tests using three lags by time of day. “Stock to Option” means the aggressiveness
variables of the stock limit order book Granger‐causing the option volatility trading variables. “Option to Stock” means the option
volatility trading variables Granger‐causing the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book. Panel C reports the
percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant Granger causality at the 5% level based on F‐tests using three
lags by option moneyness. I deﬁne, respectively, in‐the‐money options as call options with moneyness less than 0.95 and put
options with moneyness more than 1.05, out‐of‐the‐money options as call options with moneyness greater than 1.05 and put
options with moneyness less than 0.95, at‐the‐money options with moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05, inclusively. All variables
used have been normalized. See Table I for variable deﬁnitions. The sample includes the 529 stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook
History (Openbook) database and the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and
January 31, 2008.
Volatility Discovery, Stock LOB, and Options 951
TABLE X
Robustness Checks: Granger‐causality Tests Controlling for Liquidity
StockAggressiveBuy StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy OptionVolatilitySell
Panel A: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests
StockAggressiveBuy 73.55 116.89
StockAggressiveSell 80.23 121.46
OptionVolatilityBuy 31.56 9.37
OptionVolatilitySell 33.85 11.56
Time interval Stock variable Option trading variable Stock to option Option to stock
Panel B: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by time of day
9:30 am–11:00 am StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 13.04 12.58
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 12.08 10.12
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 12.23 11.16
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 14.13 13.09
11:00 am–2:30 pm StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 9.22 7.03
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 7.52 6.34
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 8.06 6.21
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 8.95 6.07
2:30 pm–4:00 pm StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 12.67 10.11
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 11.87 13.76
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 10.14 12.01
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 13.17 14.89
Moneyness Stock variable Option trading variable Stock to option Option to stock
Panel C: Pairwise Granger‐causality tests by option moneyness
ATM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 12.23 9.86
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 13.20 8.32
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 10.75 12.13
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 13.02 7.18
ITM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 8.79 7.86
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 9.40 9.72
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 10.35 10.79
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 10.62 9.36
OTM StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilityBuy 9.54 10.68
StockAggressiveBuy OptionVolatilitySell 9.36 13.11
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy 10.03 9.92
StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilitySell 9.92 11.83
Note. This table reports the results from the following VAR: St ¼
PK
i¼1 ai Sti þ
PK
i¼1 bi Oti þ
PK
i¼1 ui AmihudtiþPK
i¼1 qi Depthti þ ut and Ot ¼
PK
i¼1 g i Sti þ
PK
i¼1 diOti þ et , where St is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the aggressiveness
of the buy and sell sides of the stock limit order book,Ot is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the option volatility trading, Amihud is the
Amihud (2002) illiquiditymeasure deﬁned as the ratio of the absolute stock return to its dollar volume over 5‐minute intervals,Depth
is the total size of the limit order book at the beginning of the 5‐minute intervals, and K is the number of lags. The VAR is estimated
with three lags based on the Akaike, Schwartz, and Hannan‐Quinn information criteria. In panel A, Wald test statistics of pairwise
Granger‐causality tests between each aggressiveness variable of the stock limit order book and each option volatility trading
variable are reported. The null hypothesis is that the row variable does not Granger‐cause the column variable. All the Wald test
statistics are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Panel B reports the percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant
Granger‐causality at the 5% level based on F‐tests using three lags by time of day. “Stock to Option” means the aggressiveness
variables of the stock limit order book Granger‐causing the option volatility trading variables. “Option to Stock” means the option
volatility trading variables Granger‐causing the aggressiveness variables of the stock limit order book. Panel C reports the
percentages of the stocks in the sample with statistically signiﬁcant Granger causality at the 5% level based on F‐tests using three
lags by option moneyness. I deﬁne, respectively, in‐the‐money options as call options with moneyness less than 0.95 and put
options with moneyness more than 1.05, out‐of‐the‐money options as call options with moneyness greater than 1.05 and put
options with moneyness less than 0.95, at‐the‐money options with moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05, inclusively. All variables
used have been normalized. See Table I for variable deﬁnitions. The sample includes the 529 stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook
History (Openbook) database and the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and
January 31, 2008.
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controlling for moneyness‐based forward looking stock skewness. I also re‐run the same tests
using the VAR controlling for volume‐based forward looking stock skewness and report results
in Table IX. It is clear that the results also hold.
Among the many papers that explain optimal limit order placement for large traders
(Subramanian & Jarrow, 2001), Polimenis (2005) shows that liquidity is related to speed of
execution and that illiquid markets are characterized by slow executions. Polimenis also
reports that in such illiquid markets traders may prefer using aggressive limit orders in lieu of
market orders to avoid the exposure to lengthy executions from the latter. To connect to such
type of optimal behavior, I use the following VAR:
St ¼
XK
i¼1
aiSti þ
XK
i¼1
biOti þ
XK
i¼1
uiAmihudti þ
XK
i¼1
qiDepthti þ ut
Ot ¼
XK
i¼1
g iSti þ
XK
i¼1
diOti þ et
where St is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the aggressiveness of the buy and sell sides of the
stock limit order book,Ot is a 2 by 1 vector that represents the option volatility trading,Amihud
is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure deﬁned as the ratio of the absolute stock return to its
dollar volume over 5‐minute intervals, Depth is the total size of the limit order book at the
beginning of the 5‐minute intervals, and K is the number of lags. The VAR is estimated with
three lags based on the Akaike, Schwartz, and Hannan‐Quinn information criteria.
Table X reports the Granger‐causality ﬁndings using the above VAR and it is obvious that
all my ﬁndings hold.
So far my results are based on 5‐minute time aggregation. I now perform robustness
checks of my results using 1‐minute time aggregation.
Table XI reproduces pairwise Granger‐causality test results using 1‐minute time
intervals. It is clear that all my ﬁndings are robust to using 1‐minute time intervals.
Unreported results using 1‐minute time intervals show that the percentage of stocks with
Granger‐causality running from the stock aggressiveness variables to option volatility trading
variables is higher at the beginning and at the end of the trading day, is generally higher for
large than for small bid–ask spread, and is lower for OTM options than for ATM options.
Table XII reproduces pairwise variance decomposition results using 1‐minute time
intervals. Similar to results in Table VI, results in Table XII show that the stock aggressiveness
variables can explain the variation in the option volatility trading variables and vice versa.
TABLE XI
Robustness Checks: Pairwise Granger‐Causality Tests Using 1‐Minute Time Intervals
StockAggressiveBuy StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy OptionVolatilitySell
StockAggressiveBuy 117.48 149.58
StockAggressiveSell 111.49 171.61
OptionVolatilityBuy 34.13 16.32
OptionVolatilitySell 51.01 24.00
Note. This table reports the results from a VAR with endogenous variables in the order of StockAggressiveBuy,
StockAggressiveSell, OptionVolatilityBuy, and OptionVolatilitySell. The VAR is estimated with three lags. Wald test statistics of
pairwise Granger‐causality tests between each aggressiveness variable of the stock limit order book and each option volatility
trading variable are reported. The null hypothesis is that the row variable does not Granger‐cause the column variable. All variables
used have been normalized. All theWald test statistics are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. See Table I for variable deﬁnitions except that
I estimate snapshots of the limit order book at 1‐minute intervals and construct variables similarly.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper provides the empirical evidence on the volatility discovery across the
aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading by showing that
the two are informative for predicting each other. Further, I ﬁnd that the aggressiveness of the
stock limit order book is inversely related to option volatility buying and positively related to
option volatility selling. The impact of the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book on
option volatility trading is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. This is consistent
with Foucault (1999) that limit order traders trade less aggressively due to increased picking
off risk when perceived volatility is higher.
Taken together, my ﬁndings provide insights into the dynamic process of volatility
discovery across the stock and options markets from a unique angle. In general, I show how
TABLE XII
Robustness Checks: Variance Decompositions Using 1‐Minute Time Intervals
1‐minute intervals
ahead (n)
Forecast
standard
error
Explanatory variable
StockAggressiveBuy StockAggressiveSell OptionVolatilityBuy OptionVolatilitySell
Panel A: VAR ordering of StockAggressiveBuy, StockAggressiveSell, OptionVolatilityBuy, and
OptionVolatilitySell
StockAggressiveBuy
1 0.0078 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 0.0097 93.39 6.58 0.01 0.01
StockAggressiveSell
1 0.0075 1.01 98.99 0.00 0.00
50 0.0098 8.24 91.75 0.01 0.01
OptionVolatilityBuy
1 0.0099 0.00 0.00 99.99 0.00
50 0.0099 0.03 0.03 99.81 0.13
OptionVolatilitySell
1 0.0099 0.00 0.01 2.12 97.87
50 0.0099 0.04 0.05 2.27 97.64
Panel B: VAR ordering of OptionVolatilityBuy, and OptionVolatilitySell, StockAggressiveBuy, and
StockAggressiveSell
StockAggressiveBuy
1 0.0078 99.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 0.0097 93.38 6.58 0.02 0.02
StockAggressiveSell
1 0.0075 1.01 98.98 0.00 0.01
50 0.0098 8.23 91.73 0.02 0.02
OptionVolatilityBuy
1 0.0099 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
50 0.0099 0.03 0.03 99.81 0.13
OptionVolatilitySell
1 0.0099 0.00 0.00 2.12 97.88
50 0.0099 0.04 0.04 2.28 97.65
Note. This table reports the variance decompositions of the aggressiveness of stock limit order book and option volatility trading
variables n 1‐minute intervals ahead, computed from a VAR with endogenous variables StockAggressiveBuy, Stock-
AggressiveSell, OptionVolatilityBuy, and OptionVolatilitySell. The VAR is estimated with three lags. For each VAR, I report the
estimates of variance decompositions (%), as well as the forecast standard errors estimated with 1,000 simulation runs for two
forecast periods. The sample includes the 529 stocks in both the NYSE OpenBook History (Openbook) database and the Options
Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) database between November 1, 2007 and January 31, 2008. All variables used have been
normalized. See Table I for variable deﬁnitions except that I estimate snapshots of the limit order book at 1‐minute intervals and
construct variables similarly.
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the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option volatility trading interact with each
other and demonstrate how the aggressiveness of the stock limit order book and option
volatility trading play a dominant role in the dynamic volatility discovery. Finally, my results
reemphasize that any study on volatility discovery across the stock and options markets
ignoring limit order participation can suffer from signiﬁcant bias.
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